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Two strategic missile strikes are not enough to change the course of war, however. “The military value of both weapons is limited by the fact that there are only limited numbers of Atacms and Storm Shadow,” said Matthew Savill, the director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank.
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Matthew Savill, military sciences director at defence think tank the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), said: “Many of the best targets – helicopters and glide-bomb armed aircraft attacking Ukrainian cities and troops in the north or in Kursk – have largely moved to air bases outside the range of ATACMS.
Ukraine - Royal United Services Institute
4 days ago · Crisis over Ukraine and European Security. The confrontation between Russia and the West is not merely about the future of Ukraine’s security arrangements; it is about Europe’s entire post-Cold War strategic framework.
Will the Ukraine missile crisis change the course of the war?
3 days ago · Two strategic missile strikes are not enough to change the course of war, however. “The military value of both weapons is limited by the fact that there are only limited numbers of Atacms and Storm Shadow,” said Matthew Savill, the director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank.
News & Comment - Royal United Services Institute
Two strategic missile strikes are not enough to change the course of war, however. “The military value of both weapons is limited by the fact that there are only limited numbers of Atacms and Storm Shadow,” said Matthew Savill, the director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank.
Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024
Feb 13, 2024 · Another vulnerability for Russia's complex weapons like missiles is the extensive dependence on Western-sourced components. Although Russia has maintained a steady supply of the necessary components owing to the incoherent and lackadaisical approach to sanctions adopted by Western states, a more coherent approach to countering the Russian defence industry could disrupt supply lines.
Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s …
Nov 30, 2022 · The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has provided an invaluable opportunity to assess the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) and the implications of a range of capabilities for modern warfare.
Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23
Jul 18, 2024 · The original concept of operations for the Ukrainian offensive was sound. It required 12 armoured and mechanised brigades to achieve a breakthrough along 30 km of frontage, the isolation of Tokmak within seven days, and …
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Russia’s Cyber Campaign Shifts to Ukraine’s Frontlines
Jul 22, 2024 · The first has been penetrating devices used by Ukrainian soldiers at the front. Not only has Kyiv’s emphasis on ‘data-driven combat’ made smartphones an invaluable source of location data to establish patterns of movement and locate and target Ukrainian positions, but the military’s dependence on free encrypted messaging applications (EMAs), such as Signal for secure operational ...